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SCHR6DINGER'S CONSTITUTIONAL CAT:
LIMITS OF THE HIGH COURT'S DECLARATION OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
SHFIVPRASAP SWAMINATHAN*

Following the confusion created regardingthe territorialreach of the Delhi
HC dcision in Naz Foundation, Mr. Swam inathanargues that a thorough
analysis of Article 226 of the Indian Constitutionleads to one conclusion: a
declaration of unconstitutionalityof a Central statuteby a state High Court
renders the statue invalid only in that state. Likening it to Schridinger's
cat, the article highlights why the analysis cannot be restricted to Article
13 alone, but requires a largerjurisprudentialand ontologicaljustification.
While the decision in Kusum Ingots is the current position in India, Mr.
Swaminathan argues why this deserves to be reconsidered.
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THE SCHR6ODINGER'S CAT IN PHYSICS AND LAW

Let's begin with a brief description of Erwin Schr6dinger's famous theoretical
experiment by a dummy, for the dummy. The experiment involved leaving a cat
in a box, along with a bit of radioactive material, a vial of poison, a hammer and a
Geiger counter (a device for detecting radiation). The Geiger counter would be so
calibrated that when it sensed the decay of the radioactive material, it triggered a
hammer which was so placed as to break the vial containing the poison, which,
when released, would kill the cat. The decay of the radioactive material, being

B.S.L, LL.B (Pune); B.C.L (Oxford); D.Phil (Oxford), Asslciate Professor (Jindal Global
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Schr6dinger's ConstitutionalCat
a purely contingent event, may or may not happen; and there is no reliable
way of predicting it. According to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
physics, which the experiment was meant to illustrate, there are, in this case,
two superpositions, both equally 'real', namely, the decay and non-decay of the
radioactive material. It is only at the moment of observation that one of the two
superpositions materialises by what was technically described as the 'collapse' of
the wave function. Until the box is opened and the observation happens, "there is a
radioactivematerial that has both decayed and not decayed, a glass vessel of poison that is
neither broken nor unbroken and a cat that is neitherdead not alive".! The counterintuitive
result of the experiment is that the cat is simultaneously both alive and dead in
quantum superimposed states.
It is all very well for the quantum physics, notorious for its quirkiness, to
throw up a paradox of coterminous being and not being, but could such a thing
ever be possible in constitutional law? The equivalent of the cat in the constitutional
context being a law enacted by the Parliament and equivalent of death here
being the declaration of invalidity of the statute. The puzzle when translated to
constitutional law comes to this-could a statute enacted by the Parliament be
valid in one state and invalid in another? Would it be possible for the statute to be
invalid only for the state, the High Court of which struck it down while remaining
constitutionally valid for the rest of India? Can constitutional law allow for the
equivalent of the Schr6dinger's paradox?
In a legal system with 24 High Courts, one would expect this crucial
question to rear its head often and thus to have been settled a long time ago. To
be sure, the question does arise often. Surprisingly, however, for long there has
been very little clarity on this subject and the area has been marked by a paucity
of authoritative case law dispositive of the issue. The practitioner, perennially
troubled by this question, has been happy to rest content with classifying it as one
of those ubiquitous grey areas of the law which are universally acknowledged
for their indeterminacy. The problem should be an even more pressing one for
law enforcers. Should an official based in, say, Mumbai, charged with the task of
enforcing a central statute, disregard it because the Madras High Court has declared
the statutory provision in question to be unconstitutional? Indeterminacy here
would necessarily lead to either official overreach or abnegation of a legal duty.
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PULL OF LOGIC, INTUITION AND THE LAW

It must be admitted straightaway that our intuitions pull strongly against
allowing for the equivalent of the Schr6dinger's paradox to infest constitutional law.
Bracketing practical considerations for the moment, it would be neat and logical to
hold that a statute declared unconstitutional by a High Court is unconstitutional
for the rest of the country. The declaration of unconstitutionality assails the
constitutional competence of the lawmaker in making the impugned law;2 and
once the lawmaking authority has been declared constitutionally incompetent,
it is arguable that the law in question remains without constitutional sanction,
irrespective of the part of India it is sought to be enforced in. Logically, nothing
could be tidier. Our intuitions in this area are reinforced - and perhaps to a
certain extent, induced - by the spatial metaphors we use in describing the effect
of the declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute. A statute is thought to be and is so described in the language of lawyers - 'struck down', when declared
unconstitutional. The spatial metaphor suggests to us the image of an artefact
(the impugned law) being struck down or annihilated. The sum of our intuitions
here might suggest that a central statute when struck down by a High Court is
annihilated and goes out of existence completely. What else could 'striking down'
mean? Shouldn't the case of striking down of a statute be like lighting striking
a tree in the middle of the field so that regardless of where on the field you look
from, the tree is not in existence? Once in the sway of this metaphor, it is only a
little step to holding that a legal norm which is struck down by either the Supreme
Court or the High Court is annihilated. Just like a tree standing in the middle of
a field brought down by lightning is annihilated; and that remains to be the case
regardless of which corner of the field you happen to observe it from. Having
supposed the spatial metaphor it would then be nothing short of fanciful to argue
that despite being knocked down by lightning, the tree continues to stand if you
are standing to the north of the field and looking from an angle of 45%, but not
so if you standing to the south of the field. The spatial metaphor overwhelmingly
discredits the Schr6dinger's paradox in constitutional law. However, even a
cursory glance at some of the effects of the unconstitutionality should cast the
doubts on the plausibility of the picture suggested by the spatial metaphor. For
instance, when a statute is struck down (let us assume, for the sake of simplicity,
by the Supreme Court) for violation of Article 19(1)(a), the statute is not void for
all effects and purposes. The statute continues to remain valid for non-citizens,
2

Here, for want of a better expression adequately capturing both, cases of lack of

legislative competence and violation of Part Iii, I use the idea of 'constitutional
competence' compendiously to include both types of cases.
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since the protection of Article 19 is available only to citizens. Instances such as
these should give pause to unreserved endorsements of the annihilation picture
of unconstitutionality suggested by the spatial metaphors; and hint at something
a lot more complex in play in a declaration of unconstitutionality. Furthermore,
the scenario presented by a statute struck down for citizens remaining valid with
respect to aliens at the very least illustrates the plausibility of a situation similar
to the equivalent to the Schr6dinger's paradox in constitutional law - where the
law is simultaneously valid and invalid. Despite the familiarity of the situation
described above, it would not be unfair to say that the annihilation picture of
unconstitutionality underlies the intuitive understanding of what must transpire
when a statute is struck down by a High Court.
This understanding can be sought to be placed on the secure footing of two
constitutional provisions, namely, Article 13 and Article 226(2). It could be argued
that when it comes to effect qua Article 13, the declaration of unconstitutionality
by the High Court is no different from that of the Supreme Court. The effect of
a declaration of unconstitutionality under Article 13 would have to be in rem i.e.
binding on the world at large - and what kind of an in rem judgment would a
High Court's declaration of unconstitutionality be if it were to have effect against
the world at large, but only within the territorial confines of the state that it is a
High Court of. Article 226(2) too could be invoked by reading it in a way that
backs this thesis. Article 226(2) seeks to give extra territorial effect to the writs of
the High Court in cases where part of the cause of action, at least in part, arises
within the territorial limits of the state that it is the High Court of.3 Article 226(2)
was inserted by the Fifteenth Amendment in 1963 specifically to make the central
government (whose legal situs is in Delhi) amenable to the writs of High Courts
throughout India. It could be argued that since Article 226(2) specifically extends
the High Court's writ jurisdiction to the central government a declaration of
unconstitutionality by the High Court, should not its obvious effect be to render a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a central statute applicable throughout India?
From the background of nebulousness of authority on this issue, which has
prevailed for long, one can discern the outlines of some kind of judicial opinion
emerging favouring what has been described here as the intuitive position and
3

Article 226(1) provides that the writ of a High Court ordinarily runs only within the
territorial limits of the state; Article 226(2) provides that the High Court has extra
territorial reach over persons and authorities outside the state territory where the cause
of action upon which the writ issues arises within its jurisdiction. The Judgments which
support unlimited territorial reach of a High Court's declaration of unconstitutionality,
explicitly or implicitly rely on Article 226(2).
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dismissing the possibility of something like the equivalent of the Schr6dinger's
paradox in constitutional law. The first is a judgment of the Bombay High Court in
Commissionerof Income Tax v. GodavariDevP [Hereinafter,"Godavari Devi"] holding
that the Madras High Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of a provision of
the Income Tax Act has effect on income tax assessments in Maharashtra; then after
a long gap of three decades, an obiter dictum of the Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots
v. Union of India5 (Hereinafter,"Kusum Ingots"] which holds in the abstract, without
reference to the earlier Bombay judgment, that the declaration of unconstitutionality
of a central statute by a High Court has effect throughout India;and the most recent,
a judgment of the Madras High Court in Textile Technical Tradesmen Association v.
Union of India6 following the obiter dictum of the Supreme Court holding that the
declaration of unconstitutionality of a central law by the Andhra Pradesh High
Court has the effect of rendering the law unconstitutional throughout India. Each
of these judgments seek to avoid the equivalent of the Schr6dinger's paradox in
constitutional law by holding that a declaration of unconstitutionality of a central
statute by any of the 24 High Courts has the effect of rendering the law null and
void for the rest of the country as well. 7 The contrary proposition, allowing the
paradox by holding that the declaration of unconstitutionality by a High Court
has effect only within the territorial limits of the state that it is a High Court of
doesn't have the backing of any direct authority.,

4

5

6
7
8

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Godavari Devi, [19781 113 ITR 589 (Born). In A.M. Sali
Maricar v. ITO 11973] 90 ITR 116 (Mad), the Madras High Court struck down section
140A(3) of the Income Tax Act as ultra vires Article 19(l)(f) of the Constitution. The
question in Godavari Devi was whether this was binding on the income tax officers in
Maharashtra. The Bombay High Court held that unless the High Court of the state
within which the authority operates hands down a contrary judgment, the declaration
of unconstitutionality by the High Court of another state is binding. It was thus held
that income tax authorities in Maharashtra are bound to proceed on the assumption
that section 140A(3) is non-existent.
Kusum Ingots v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254, at 261:
The court must have the requisite territorial jurisdiction. An order passed on writ
petition questioning the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act whether interim
or final keeping in view the provisions contained in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, will have effect throughout the territory of India subject of course
to the applicability of the Act.
Textile Technical Tradesmen Association v. Union of India, (2011) 1 L.L.J. 297 (Mad).
None of the three judgments invoke Article 13.
One might be tempted to read Thakkar J.'s opinion in Durgesh Sharma v. Jayashree,
(2008) 9 SCC 648 as supporting this contrary proposition. However, no such support
is discernible. Thakkar j. only points out that the High Court doesn't have as extensive
a jurisdiction as the Supreme Court; and that unlike the Supreme Court, there are
territorial limits to the High Court's jurisdiction. From that observation alone, no
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Despite the strong pull of intuitions and the weight of authority to the
contrary, it will be argued here that something like the equivalent of Schrbdinger's
paradox ought to be the inevitable legal consequence of the declaration of
unconstitutionality of a central statute by a High Court in India given the
delineation of judicial authority in the Constitution. It will be argued that, on a
proper jurisprudential analysis of the matter, when a High Court declares a central
statute to be unconstitutional, like Schr6dinger's cat it remains both valid (alive)
and invalid (dead) concurrently: it is invalid in the state that the High Court belongs
to, but remains valid in the rest of the country. The issue under discussion here
gained some practical heat in the wake of the judgment of the Delhi High Court
in Naz Foundationv. Govt of NCd [Hereinafter, "Naz Foundation"]partially striking
down as unconstitutional, section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. In practical terms,
the question under discussion here, then translated into whether the Delhi High
Court's judgment in Naz Foundation prevented a police official in any of the other
states from acting on section 37720
It will be argued here that our intuitions in this matter tend to be scrambled
and the spatial metaphors mislead. A statute doesn't exist like other objects in the
physical world and the 'striking down' of the statute is not like the destruction of
an object. Rather, it involves a complex web of interrelationship between agents
in different functions of the government as a result of which we need not invoke
something as mysterious and baffling as the Copenhagen interpretation to explain
how a central statute remains simultaneously valid (in the rest of India) and invalid
(in the state to which the High Court striking down the law belongs). A rather
straightforward jurisprudential explanation would suffice. An explanation along
these lines will be attempted in Section IV. The argument in Section IV however
requires some scene setting by way of an explanation of the history of Article 226
which will be found in Section III.

9
10

inference can be drawn supporting the proposition that the High Court's declaration
of unconstitutionality makes the central statute invalid only in the state which it is
High Court of.
Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT, 160 Delhi Law Times 277.
See, Shivprasad Swaminathan, All India Permit INDIAN ExPRESS (9 July 2009), available
at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/allindia-permit/487413/ (Last visited on 30
July 2013). I argued that the Delhi High Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of
section 377 of the Indian Penal Code would be effective only for the territory of Delhi.
Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, I argued, remains intact for the rest of India until
such time as the Supreme Court decides to strike it down. While I still continue to
endorse that position, I support it with a different set of arguments and the addition of
a qualification: what has been argued here ought to be the position of the law, though
the actual position of law is the contrary, thanks to the Supreme Court s obiter dictum
in Kusum Ingots which will remain binding until overruled by the Supreme Court itself.
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III. A

BRIEF HISTORY OF ARTICLE

226

In the present section it will be argued that the line of reasoning advanced
in Kusum Ingots gives Article 226(2) a much wider scope than was intended by the
Fifteenth Amendment which introduced it. For accomplishing this, tracing the
history of Article 226 will be indispensable.
The original Article 226 was exhausted by what is now clause (1) of Article 226.
It did not contain anything along the lines of clause (2) of Article 226. The Supreme
Court was presented with the occasion to construe the original un-amended Article
226 for the first time in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao" where it held
that the power of the High Court to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution
was subject to the two-fold limitation: (i) that such writs cannot run beyond the
territories subject to its jurisdiction; and (ii) that the person or authority to whom
the High Court is empowered to issue writs must be amenable to the jurisdiction
of the High Court either by residence or location within the territories subject to
its jurisdiction.
The issue came up for consideration again in Lt.Col.Khajoor Singh v. Union of
India" [Hereinafter,"Khajoor Singh"] where a majority of a Constitution bench of
the Supreme Court approved Saka lVenkata Rao. Sinha CJ. delivering the judgment
for the majority amplified on the reasoning inherent in Saka Venkata Rao. Sinha
C.J., emphasising on the difference between 'location' and 'functioning' of the
government, held that while the Union Government may be functioning all over
India, only the High Court of the state within whose jurisdiction the government
was 'located' could issue writs to it. 13
A Government may be functioning all over a State or all over India;
but it certainly is not located all over the State or all over India. It
is true that the Constitution has not provided that the seat of the
Government, of India will be at New Delhi. That, however, does not
mean' that the Government of India as such has no seat where it is
located. It is common knowledge that the seat of the Government
of India is in New Delhi 'and the Government as such is located in
New Delhi. The absence of a provision in the Constitution can make
no difference to this fact.

11

12
13

Election Commission, India v, Saka Venkata Rao, 1953 SCR 1144.
1961 (2) SCR 828.
Id, at 840
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Accordingly, Sinha C.J. opined that the Punjab High Court alone would have
jurisdiction to issue writs against the Union Government, which was situated in
Delhi, 4 This position led to obvious difficulties for litigants in far flung parts of
India seeking relief against the Union Government as Subba Rao J. noted in his
dissenting judgment:"
If the contention of the respondents be accepted, whenever the Union
Government infringes the right of a person in any remote part of the
country, he must come all the way to New Delhi to enforce his right

by filing a writ petition in the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court.
If a common man residing in Kanyakumari, the southern-most part
of India, his illegally detained in prison, or deprived of his property
otherwise than by law, by an order of the Union Government, it
would be a travesty of fundamental rights to expect him to come to
New Delhi to seek the protection of the High Court of Punjab. This
construction of the provisions of Article 226 would attribute to the
framers of the Constitution an intention to confer the right on a person
and to withhold from him for all practical purposes the remedy to
enforce his right against the Union Government. Obviously it could
not have been the intention of the Constituent Assembly to bring
about such an anomalous result in respect of what they conceived to
be a cherished right conferred upon the citizens of this country. In
that event, the right conferred turns out to be an empty one and the
object of the framers of the Constitution is literally defeated.
Subba Rao J. cited with approval, the opinion of Sapru J. of Allahabad High
Court in Maqbul- Un-Nissa v. Union of India16 which he noted was decided 'without
being oppressed' by the decision of the Supreme Court in Saka Venkata Rao's, having
predated the latter judgment. 7 In Maqbul-Un-Nissa, stating that the real test of
jurisdiction under Article 226 ought to depend not upon where the headquarters
or the capital of the government is situate but upon the fact of the functioning of
the government whether union or state being within the territorial limits of this
Court, Sapru J. noted that the words 'any government' in Article 226 indicated
"that the founding fathers knew that more than one government would function within
the same territory".18

14

The Delhi High Court came into existence in 1966. Before that, Delhi housed the circuit

bench of the Punjab High Court.
15

Khajoor Singh, supra note 12, at 850.

16

Maqbul- Un-Nissa v. Union of India, IL.R. [1953] 2 AR. 289.

17
18

Khajoor Singh, supra note 12, at 861,
Khajoor Singh, supra note 12, at 292.
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With the Supreme Court's judgment in Khajoor Singh it was unequivocally
settled that Article 226 granted jurisdiction on the basis of location of the government
alone, regardless of its functioning or the effects of its actions. As a consequence,
the fact that the cause of action arose within the territorial limits of the High Court,
could not confer jurisdiction on it.' 9To remedy the practical difficulties this caused
- which were discussed by Subba Rao J. in his dissenting opinion - the Fifteenth
Amendment Act 1963 introduced what now appears as clause (2) of Article 226.
The Statements of Objects and Reasons of the Constitution (Fifteenth amendment
Act) 1963 state:

Under the existing Article 226 of the Constitution, the only High Court
which has jurisdiction with respect to the Central Government is the
Punjab High Court. This involves considerable hardship to litigants
from distant places. It is, therefore, proposed to amend article 226 so
that when any relief is sought against any Government, authority or
person for any action taken, the High Court within whose jurisdiction
the cause of action arise may also have jurisdiction to issue appropriate
directions, orders or writs.
The Supreme Court's reading of Article 226 in Kusum Ingots is unsatisfactory
as it is not adequately sensitive to the history of Article 226. As discussed above,
the sole purpose of Article 226(2) was to remedy the anomaly that arose due to the
Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the original Article 226. The change
made by Article 226(2) was to expand the High Court's jurisdiction to issue writs to
the union government. It did this, not by making the union government amenable
to the High Court's jurisdiction in all cases, but only in cases where the union
governmentfiunctions within the territorial limits of the High Court, regardless of
the fact that the union government is located in Delhi.20 Such a jurisdiction for the
High Court had been specifically rejected by the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the original Article 226 and this is precisely what the fifteenth amendment sought
to introduce through Article 226(2). Article 226(2) certainly was not intended to
give the High Court jurisdiction in all matters, regardless of whether it pertained
to thefunctioning of the union government within its territories. More significantly,

19

Surajmal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1958 M.P, 103. The Madhya Pradesh High
Court held that the writ prayed for could not be issued so as to bind the Central
Government because, "the Central Government could not Le deemed to be permanently
located or normally carrying on its business within the jurisdictionof the High Court". Id, at
115.

20

To be sure, the language used in Article 226(2) is that of 'cause of action'. But this
produces results identical to what would have been produced by use of the idea of
'functioning' of the government. The petitioner (appellant) in Khajoor Singh used the
cause of action and functioning argument interchangeably.
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Article 226(2) was not calculated to extend the High Court's jurisdiction to other
state governments and its officials. Thus, a state government official in Maharashtra
exercising powers (within Maharashtra) under a central statute does not become
subject to the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court because the official does not
function within the territorial limits of the Madras High Court. Underlying the
Supreme Court's judgment in Kusum Ingots is a reading of Article 226(2) which
extends the High Court's jurisdiction to cases beyond the ones where respondent
government or official functions within its territories. If the proposition is taken to
its logical conclusion, it would lead to the state official in Mumbai being subject
to the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court. 21 It will be argued in the following
sections that this proposition is as unacceptable as the proposition which seeks to
give the High Court's declaration of unconstitutionality effect throughout India
as they both ultimately rest on the same premise. It will be argued in Section IV
that to give effect to a High Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of a central
statute, throughout the territories of IAndia would amount to grant it jurisdiction
over officials who do not function within the territories that it is the High Court
of, in the teeth of the legislative history of Article 226(2). It will be argued that the
territorial limits of a High Court's declaration of unconstitutionality are isomorphic
with the territorial limits of its jurisdiction - because they both depend on the
persons (officials) over which the jurisdiction extends. It will also be argued that
the declaration of unconstitutionality does not have universal i.e. nationwide effect
precisely because the High Court does not have nationwide jurisdiction.

IV. THE ONTOLOGY OF LAW

AND DECLARATION OF

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
The law does not exist like artefacts in the physical universe. Unpacking
the specific ontology of law calls for attention to the web of social relations that
constitute a legal system.? In the present section, we will begin with an account
of the existence of laws based on H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law before setting
out an account of declaration of unconstitutionality of law along Hartian lines.'

21
22
23

And similarly be subject to the jurisdiction of all other High Courts.
H.L.A. Hart points out that when we speak of the existence or ontology of the law we
refer "in a compressed portmanteau form to a number of heterogeneous socialfacts". HL.A,
Hart, Tim CoNcsi'T oF LAW, 112 ( 2 ,d ed., 1994).
To be sure, Hart's account has its detractors; furthermore, one also finds diverse
readings of Hart's account. In the limited space available here, however, it would not
be possible to launch a satisfactory defence of the Hartian project or of my particular
reading of it. The account of declaration of unconstitutionality sketched here attempts to
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Hart argued that law is the union of primary and secondary rules.2 4 Primary
rules impose duties on people to behave in certain ways. Secondary rules, by
contrast, pertain to the primary rules. Primary rules do not themselves settle
which of them meet the criteria of legal validity and thus are to count as primary
rules in the first place, or the solution in the event of a conflict between two or
more primary rules. This is where the secondary rules assume significance. They
lend an element of dynamism to the legal system of which they are a part by
permitting it to solve problems that would arise were it to comprise exclusively
of primary rules alone.25 Hart identifies three types of secondary rules: rule of
recognition, adjudication and change. Rules of recognition provide conclusive
methods for ascertaining which primary rules meet the criteria of legal validity.
Rules of change enable and regulate the process of altering, and repealing primary
rules. Rules of adjudication empower some officials (courts) to make authoritative
determinations of departures and violations. These three types of rule exhaust the
realm of secondary rules for Hart.
In addition to the distinction between primary and secondary rules noted
above, Hart drew another distinction - between the fundamental rule of the legal
system and every other rule that falls within it including primary and secondary
rules. Unhappily, he calls this master rule, the fundamental rule of recognition.
Because of this terminological oddity, what we understand as the secondary rules of
recognition, would be a logically lower when viewed in relation to the fundamental
rule of recognition. In other words, the fundamental rule of recognition, among other
a6The fundamental
things, sets out what the rule of recognition of the legal system is3
rule of recognition is not some rule that 'exists', which can be acknowledged or fail
to be acknowledged by the officials. Rather the acknowledgment by the officials
in fact constitutes the rule of recognition: "the rule of recognition is not stated but its
existence is shown in the way in which particularrules are identified either by the courts

approach the question with the aid of tools which figure prominently in Hart's account
24
25
26

though Hart himself never had the occasion to turn his attention to the question of
declaration of unconstitutionality.
For a discussion of primary and secondary rules see Shivprasad Swaminathan, The

PhilosophicalFoundations of the Basic Structure Doctrine: Entrenchment or Defeasibility?
in Sanjay Jain and Sathya Narayan, BASIC STRUCTURE CONVSTITUTIONALIsM, 257 (2011).
Hart argues that a legal system with primary rules alone would be entirely static: Supra
note 22, at 92.
This is a point at which Hart is most liable to be misunderstood. The literature
about Hart seems to sparsely notice the difference between the fundamental rule of
recognition and the rule of recognition., adjudication and change.

Schriidinger'sConstitutionalCat

or other officials".2 Just as a multiplication table is the result of the application of
rules of multiplication, the existence of the fundamental rule of recognition is to
be "established by reference to actual practice: to the way in which courts identify what
is to count a law".28 Perhaps Hart could have avoided the terminology of 'rules' in
describing what is, in reality, a 'practice' that forms the core of the legal system.
Hart ties up the existence of the fundamental rule of recognition to the existence
of the legal system. Where there is a fundamental rule of recognition practiced by
the officials we have the conditions 'necessary and sufficient' for the existence of a
legal system. 29 Thus, what Hart calls the fundamental rule of recognition is simply a
catalogue of what laws the top officials of a legal system - in which the courts play
3
a very significant part-actually identify, apply and acknowledge to be the law.
Hart characterised the fundamental rule of recognition as laying down the
test of what the law is in a particular legal system. He described the British rule
of recognition, at the relevant time, as "whatever the Queen in Parliamentenacts
is law". 31 From Hart's depiction of the British rule of recognition one might be
tempted to treat the fundamental rule of recognition as synonymous with the
Constitution itself, but this would not be right. The Constitution, or at least a written
Constitution, can be amended by following the procedure set out in the Constitution
(the rule of change), but the fundamental rule of recognition being grounded in
a social practice is not open to amendment in such a manner. The Constitution
is the amalgam of the rules of recognition, change and adjudication. In a legal
system where the Constitution is supreme, the fundamental rule of recognition
would roughly be to the effect: "whatever the constitutionprescribes is law".32 Where
there is a written Constitution, the rules of recognition, adjudication and change

27
28
29
30

31
32

Supra note 22, at 101.
Supra note 22, at 108.
Supra note 22, at 116.
In the postscript to the Concept of Law, Hart, overemphasising the role of the courts in
constituting the fundamental rule of recognition, argues that the rule of recognition
is constituted exclusively by the practice of the courts. But this cannot be right; the
official functionaries in the other important organs of the government must play a role
in constituting the rule of recognition: See Supra note 22, at 250, 258, 266-67.
Supra note 22, at 107.
In a legal system such as India's, the courts have a significant say in what the
Constitution is. Thus the fundamental rule of recognition which effectively obtains in
India could be characterised as: 'the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court

is Supreme'. This is a little less dramatic than Justice Charles Evan Hughes' statement
of the American rule of recognition, "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is
what the judges say it is". ADDRESSES OF CHARLEs EVAN HucnES, 185 (2 a ed., 1916).
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are institutionalised since they are specified in the Constitution itself. The rules of
recognition set out the criteria of legal validity, and hence pick out the set of legal
rules for a particular legal system, because the law of a particular system just is
the set of rules that officials of a certain system are under a duty to apply and the
rules of recognition sets out the content of this dutyY.As long as a rule bears the
characteristics of legality set out in the rules of recognition, it exists and is legally
valid. There is no requirement that each rule be separately practiced.' In addition
to establishing the validity of all the primary rules, the rule of recognition of a
given legal system exhaustively determines what count as laws of the legal system.
Since the legal system Hart had as his analysandum was the British one, he
did not extend his analysis to declaration of unconstitutionality by the court5
However, though Hart did not turn his focus to constitutional review, the tools he
employs to illuminate the nature of a legal system and the specific mode of existence
of law are versatile enough to be profitably employed to yield an understanding
of constitutional review and declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute. The
analysis of unconstitutionality of statutes that follows here will be constructed
from such Hartian tools. As we discussed earlier, the rules of recognition set out
the criteria of legal validity, and hence pick out the set of legal rules for a particular
legal system, because the law of a particular system is just the set of rules that
officials of a certain system are under a duty to apply; the rules of recognition set
out the content of this duty and impose on the officials a duty to apply the rules
that pass the test of validity stipulated by the rules of recognition. The declaration
of unconstitutionality involves the power to declare a norm to be ultra vires the
Constitution; it is a declaration to the effect that the norm in question does not
meet the criteria of validity specified in the rule of recognition and hence doesn't
quality to count as law23 Now, to whom is this declaration addressed and what
is the content of this declaration? Being a directive that pertains exclusively to the
rule of recognition, the declaration of unconstitutionality is addressed to the law
officials who are under the duty to apply the rule in question and the content of
the declaration is in the form of a directive to the officials to norm apply the rule
in questionY In arriving at this result, the court applies the rule of recognition
33
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See, Kevin Toh, Hart'sExpressivism and his Benthamite Project ii
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In the British legal system that Hart had before him, the notion of the sovereignty of
the Queen-in -Parliament was axiomatic; constitutional review was thus something
unthinkable in such a system.
This power or authority can be seen as deriving from the rule of adjudication.
It must be stressed that in arguing for this point, Ido not seek to invoke the Kelsenian
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Schr6dinger's ConstitutionalCat
to determine whether the statute meets the criteria of validity. Accordingly, a
declaration of unconstitutionality involves a finding by the court that the legal
norm in question does not meet the criteria of legal validity specified in the rule
of recognition, Thus, contrary to the images that the misleading spatial metaphors
such as 'striking down the law' invoke, the declaration of unconstitutionality is
best understood as an exercise in negative law making; it can be understood as
the promulgation by the courts, of a directive, to the effect that the law in question
ought not to be applied. Now, how does all this apply to the case presently under
discussion?
Perhaps the most important element of this analysis for our present purposes
is likely to slip past unnoticed. To render the element conspicuous we need to
zoom in a little on one of the aspects of our analysis, namely, the relationship
between the issuers and recipients of the norm that constitutes the declaration
of unconstitutionality. The analysis proposed here is likely to suggest that a
declaration of unconstitutionality has the effect of issuance by the court of a norm
to all officials in a legal system; or in other words, that all officials in the legal
system are duty bound to comply with the declaration of unconstitutionality. It
might also be thought to suggest that if a rule is declared as not passing the test
of validity proposed the rule is invalid, tout court. It is of some significance to note
that these conclusions are only reachable on one assumption that goes virtually
unstated - and that pertains to the relationship of authority between the court and
the officials. The assumption here is that the rules of recognition and adjudication
combined give the court in question unquestionable authority over all the officials
in the legal system; making all of them duty bound to follow the norm laid down
by the court.38 Perhaps this assumption can be seen as a vestige of the thrall in
which the spatial metaphor of striking down a statute holds us. Let us for a moment
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view that the law is an indirect system of guidance which does not tell subjects what
to do but that it tells officials what to do to its subjects under certain conditions. For
Kelsen the legal duty not to steal is a norm addressed to officials to apply the norm
which stipulates a sanction for stealing: See, Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and
State, 61 (1945). What is being argued for here is the far less questionable claim that a
determination of what primary rule does and does not counts as law under the rule
of recognition is addressed to the officials, not the primary rule itself,
In strictly Hohfeldian terms, 'authority' is nothing but 'power' which is the jural
correlative of 'liability', not 'duty'. Strictly speaking thus, the officials over whom the
court has authority are 'liable' to follow the courts directives, not 'duty bound'. The
use of 'liability' in this context however, is liable to cause some confusion. Hence, I
will continue to use 'authority' and 'duty' as jural correlates. See, W.N. Hohfeld., Some
FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning 23 YALE LAW jOURNAL 16
(1913).
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call this assumption into question. There is no a priorireason why a court which
issues a directive of unconstitutionality should be thought to have authority over
all officials in the legal system. This is purely a contingent matter for stipulation
in the Constitution. It is perfectly possible for different courts to have authority in
this matter over different officials, just as it is possible for a court to have authority
over all officials in the system in the matter. This, delineation of authority in other
words, is completely a matter of stipulation in the Constitution concerned,
To find out the effect of declaration of unconstitutionality by a court in India,
we must turn to an inquiry of the delineation of authority in this regard in the
Constitution of India. In order to do this, we must pose the following questions:
Which is the court issuing the declaration of unconstitutionality? Which are the
officials over which the Constitution gives the court authority?39 Let us first answer
these questions in the case of declaration of unconstitutionality by the Supreme
Court of India. Article 141 makes the judgments of the Supreme Court binding
throughout the territory of India.40 This gives the Supreme Court authority over
all officials in India, wherever they may happen to be. When the Supreme Court
declares a statute as unconstitutional, it has the effect of calling upon all officials in
India to desist from acting on the statute in question. This has the effect of creating
the illusion of total annihilation of the statute.
Now, what about the declaration of unconstitionality by the High Court?
We must once again put to ourselves the second of the two questions we looked
into earlier, namely, which are the officials over which the Constitution gives the
High Court authority? The answer to this question is to be found in Article 226.
The answer which emerges from a combined reading of both the relevant clauses of
Article 226 is that the High Court has jurisdiction over officials: a) who are within
the territorial limits of the state it is High Court of; b) whose actions give rise to a
cause of action within the territorial limits of the state it is High Court of even if
they are ordinarily functioning outside the territorial limits of the state. This gives
the High Court jurisdiction over all officials of the state government (of the state it
is the High Court of) and officials of the central government who are situated in
the territorial limits of the High Court, even on officials located outside (whether
of the union government or another state government) provided their actions have
the effect of giving rise to a cause of action within the territorial limits of state it

39

Te second question is to be answered on a combined reading of the rules of recognition
and adjudication.

40

Article 141, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950: "The law declared by the Supreme Court shall
be binding on all courts within the territoryof India".
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is High Court of. Applying these principles we are in a position to test the effect
of the declaration of unconstitutionality by the High Court. The declaration of
unconstitutionality of a statute by the High Court is binding on all state government
officials of the state it is High Court of. It is also binding on officials belonging to
the union government who seek to enforce the statute so as to giving rise to a cause
of action within the territorial limits of the state it is High Court of.
Let us now look at two situations to clarify the proposed principle: one,
where the central statute is sought to be enforced by a state government official
(of another state), like in the case of the Indian Penal Code; and second, where the
central statute is sought to be enforced by officials of the central government like
in the case of the income tax statute. In case of the Indian Penal Code, since it is
enforced by police officers who are officials of the state government, the declaration
of unconstitutionality by a high court should only have effect within the territorial
limits of the state it is the High Court of.4" Hence, when the Delhi High Court
partially strikes down section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, it ought to have effect
only within the territorial limits of the state of Delhi, not beyond. The Income
Tax Act is enforced by officials belonging to the union government. All income
tax officials functioning within the state that the High Court belongs to would be
subjpt to the High Court's jurisdiction. However, income tax officials functioning in
other states would not ordinarily be subject to the High Court's jurisdiction unless
their actions at least, in part, give rise to a cause of action within the territories of
the state which the High Court belongs to. Thus, ordinarily, an income tax official
in Mumbai is not subject to the Madras High Court's writ jurisdiction. Given this
legal scenario, a High Court's declaration of invalidity of a provision in the Income
Tax Act has effect only on income tax officials functioning within the State of Tamil
Nadu. It could have effect on officials functioning in other states only in so far as
their actions have the effect of creating a cause of action within Tamil Nadu. In other
words the Madras High Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of a provision
ought to have no effect on an income tax official functioning in Mumbai who is
determining the liability of an assessee who also is based in Mumbai. To give a
High Court's declaration of unconstitutionality effect throughout the territories
of India has the effect of giving the High Court greater jurisdictional reach than
was intended by the drafters of the fifteenth amendment.
It has, for long been accepted that the Delhi High Court's interpretation of
a section of the Indian Contract Act would not have any force in Maharashtra.
41
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If the state of Maharashtra is a defendant in such a suit-and assuming a part
of the cause of action arose in Delhi - we would maintain that of course the
state of Maharashtra as a party is bound by the ruling and would have to satisfy
the decree. Even in future contracts, where a part of the cause of action arises
in Delhi, the government of Maharashtra would have to remain bound by the
Delhi High Court's interpretation of the Indian Contract Act. However, it could
not for a moment be suggested that the Delhi High Court's interpretation of the
Indian Contract Act on which the iuling was made becomes the law in the state of
Maharashtra. We would not have the least hesitation in saying that a Civil Judge in
Pune is not bound by the Delhi High Court's interpretation of the Indian Contract
Act where the cause of action wholly arises in Maharashtra or where the contract
specifically confers jurisdiction on the courts in Pune, to the exclusion of all other
courts. Even Sinha J. who authored the judgment in Kusum Ingots recognises this
principle in respect of interpretation of a central statute by the High Court in
Ambika Industries,4 2 The reason the High Court's interpretation of a central statute
would not be binding on couirts in the rest of the country is that they fall outside the
High Court's jurisdiction, though the law being interpreted has effect throughout
India. If we think in this fashion about a rule of contract law interpreted by the
Delhi High Court why should a contrary principle present itself when we think
about a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Delhi High Court? It has been
argued here that the principles that limit the High Court's jurisdiction in the case
of the interpretation of a central statute also limit its jurisdiction in the case of a
declaration of unconstitutionality. Declaration of unconstitutionality is, for want of
a better phrase, an exercise of negative law making power. In reality, the striking
down of a law amounts to the promulgation of a new norm calling upon the
officials to not act upon the law which is being stuck down. The recipients of this
rule are the legal officials. Since the High Court has jurisdiction over some officials
and no jurisdiction over others, it is inevitable that the High Court's declaration
of unconstitutionality would not have effect throughout India. The central statute
declared to be unconstitutional by a High Court is invalid in some places (the state
that it is high court of) and valid in others. On a proper analysis, thus we find that
the equivalent of the Schr6dinger's paradox is an unavoidable consequence of the
delineation of authority in the Constitution of India.
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Arnbika Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2007) 6 SCC 769: Sinha J.
recognises that a High Court's interpretation of a central tax statute is not binding on
courts and tribunals in other states.
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V. WHAT THE LAW IS AND WHAT IT OUGHT TO BE
It was argued earlier that those attracted by the spatial metaphor could
invoke Article 13 in support of their position. It could be argued that Article 13
renders the entire jurisdictional debate otiose because it provides that any law that
infringes Part III of the Constitution is unconstitutional and there is no territorial
limitation to Article 13. It could be argued that when it comes to effect qua Article
13, the declaration of unconstitutionality by the High Court is no different from
that of the Supreme Court. Surely, this argument, if right, discredits the central
argument advanced in this paper. In response to this objection, it could be pointed
out that all that Article 13 does is stipulate the effect of invalidity of the law in
event of its conflict with Part III of the Constitution. It does not stipulate: a) who
has the authority to invalidate such laws; and b) the limits of such authority's
jurisdiction.43 It has been argued here that a declaration of unconstitutionality is
a fresh norm issued by the court not to act upon the impugned law. Now, relying
solely on Article 13, we cannot determine the limits of the authority of the court
in making declarations of unconstitutionality. In other words, Article 13 doesn't
specify which officials are duty bound to give effect to the court's declaration of
unconstitutionality. The question returns to stare us in the face, despite Article
13 - over which persons does the court have authority in issuing a declaration of
unconstitutionality? That question cannot be answered by Article 13. It can only be
answered by looking at the extent of the court's jurisdiction. In case of the Supreme
Court that is to be found in Article 141. In case of a High Court it is to be found in
Article 226; and bringing out its consequences has been the burden of this paper.
I have argued that on a proper understanding of the ontology of the
law and delineation of authority under the Constitution something like the
equivalent of Schr6dinger's paradox is the inevitable legal consequence of the
declaration of unconstitutionality of a central statute by a High Court. On a
proper jurisprudential analysis of the matter, when a High Court declares a central
statute to be unconstitutional, like Schr6dinger's cat it ought to be understood as
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In AK .Gopalan, Kania C.J. thought that Article 13 was inserted out of abundant caution
and only states what should in any case have been obvious without it: See, A.K. Gopalan
v. State of Madras, 1950 SCR 88, 100. Hidayatullah J. questioned Kania C.J. on this point
by arguing that Article 13 is hardly redundant, as Kania C.J. makes it out to be: See,
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1965 (1) SCR 933, 961. Whatever view one may take
on the broader debate about the redundancy of the provision, there is no denying the
fact that even in the absence of Article 13, the judiciary would have had the power of
constitutional review; in fact, Article 13 doesn't even spell this out explicitly, let alone
specifying the limits of the court's authority in exercise of such power.
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remaining both valid (alive) and invalid (dead) concurrently: invalid in the state
that the High Court belongs to, but valid in the rest of the country. A declaration
of unconstitutionality of a central statute by a High Court ought not to have effect
throughout India. It must be stressed this is what ought to be the case on a proper
characterisation of the problem. This however is not the law, as it currently stands.
The obiter dicta of the Supreme Court are binding on all lower courts." As a result,
the obiter dictum of the Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots giving a nationwide effect
to a High Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of a central statute stands
as the law. This means that the constitutional cat is dead. It is hoped however,
that a fuller appreciation of the of the phenomena underlying a declaration of
unconstitutionality could persuade the Supreme Court to revive it in one of the
superpositions a la Schriidinger's cat.
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It is now settled that the obiter dicta of the Supreme Court must be treated as binding
on the High Courts. See, Mohandas lssardas v. A.N. Sattanathan, AIR 1955 Born 113.
Chagla C.J. opined that courts in India have always been bound by the obiter dicta of
the Privy Council in variance with the general common law principle to the contrary,
in the interests of judicial uniformity and judicial discipline. With the Supreme Court

having taken the place of the Privy Council at the apex of the legal system, the Courts
in India are required to treat the obiter dicta of the Supreme Court similarly. To the
same effect are the judgments of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax
v. Vazir Sultan and Sons, 1959 SCR Supl. (2) 375; Amritsar Municipality v. Hazara
Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1083; and Oriental Insurance Company v. Meena Variyal, (2007)
5 SCC 428. In Popcorn Entertainment Corporation v. City Industrial Development
Corporation, 2009 (6)Born CR 53, the Bombay High Court held that: "With thegradual
erosion of the distinction betueen ratio and obiter the practice has gained ground/for treating
even the obiter dicta of the Supreme Court binding on the High Court". Id, at T 93. See also,
Aswini Kumar Roy v. Kshitish Chandra Sen Gupta, AIR 1971 Cal 252.

